The same principle is applicable in computing the period of 15 days under Section 138(c) of the N. Counsel submitted in (2000) 8 SCC 649 Section 12 of the Limitation Act is held to be in pari materia with Section 9 of the General Clauses Act. Thus, for the purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which the cause of action arises, the starting date on which the cause of action arises should be included for computing the period of 30 days.

Counsel submitted that in the same judgment this Court has held that use of words ‘from’ and ‘within’ does not reflect any contrary intention and the first day on which the cause of action arises has to be excluded. Counsel further submitted that Section 138(c) and Section 142(b) prescribe the period within which certain acts are required to be done.

There was no dispute about the fact that notice sent by fax was received by the complainant on the same date i.e. This Court observed that as per clause (c) of Section 138, starting point of period for making payment is the date of receipt of the notice.


Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.

‘15/10/1995’ has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time. Referring to several English decisions on the point, this Court observed that the principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U. Section 138(b) provides that the payee must make a demand of the amount due to him within 30 days of the receipt of information from the bank.

Since amount was not paid, offence was committed and, therefore, cause of action arose from 26/6/1996 and the period of limitation for filing complaint expired on 26/7/1996 i.e.

the date on which period of one month expired as contemplated under Section 142(b).

Counsel urged that the reference be answered in light of his submissions. It is necessary to first refer to SIL Import USA on which heavy reliance is placed by the respondents as it takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh.

In SIL Import USA, the complainant- Company’s case was that the accused owed a sum of US $ 72,075 (equivalent to more than 26 lakhs of rupees) to it towards the sale consideration of certain materials.The accused gave some post-dated Cheques in repayment thereof.Two of the said Cheques when presented on 3/5/1996 for encashment were dishonoured with the remark “no sufficient funds”.Counsel submitted that there is no justification to exclude the 16th day of the 15 day period under Section 138(c) or the first day of the 30 days period under Section 142(b) as has been wrongly decided in Saketh. It bestows discretion upon the court to accept a complaint after the period of 30 days and to condone the delay.This would amount to exclusion of the starting date of the period. Counsel pointed out that by Amending Act 55 of 2002, a proviso was added to Section 142(b) of the N. This amendment signifies that prior to this amendment the courts had no discretion to condone the delay or exclude time by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.Such exclusion has been held to be against the law in SIL Import USA. The statement of objects and reasons of the Amending Act 55 of 2002 confirms the legal position that the N. Act being a special statute, the Limitation Act is not applicable to it.

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